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Abstract
It has been commonly argued, on the basis of Go¨del’s theorem
and related mathematical results, that true artificial intelligence can-
not exist. Penrose has further deduced from the existence of human
intelligence that fundamental changes in physical theories are needed.
I provide an elementary demonstration that these deductions are mis-
taken.
Is real artificial intelligence possible? Are present-day theories of physics
sufficient for a reductionist explanation of consciousness? Among the long
history of discussions of these questions [1–4], the eloquent writings of Pen-
rose [2] stand out for strong mathematical arguments that give negative an-
swers to both questions.
For a physicist, Penrose’s result is quite striking. He claims that under-
standing the human brain entails big changes in current microscopic theories
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of physics (e.g., quantum mechanics in general and quantum gravity in par-
ticular). This is contrary to our normal scientific experience. The enormous
progress in both elementary particle physics and in molecular biology during
the last 30 years has had no direct mutual influence on the two fields, except
on our students’ career choices. Now we have an eminent theoretical physicist
telling elementary particle physicists to look to neurons rather than multi-
billion-dollar accelerators for progress in physics. Should we believe him?
In this paper, I provide an elementary argument that this chain of rea-
soning fails.
1 Penrose’s argument
Penrose observes that current microscopic theories of physics are compu-
tational, and that they appear to underlie all chemical and biological phe-
nomena. It follows that it is possible to simulate all properties of biological
organisms by a computer program. Of course, the computer program will
be impractically big to implement, but this fact does not affect Penrose’s
mathematics. Among the biological organisms are mathematicians, so the
computer program provides artificial mathematicians that are completely
equivalent to human mathematicians. This runs afoul of Turing’s halting
theorem, which, taken at face value, implies that artificial mathematicians
are always less powerful than human mathematicians.
From this contradiction, Penrose deduces that better theories of physics
are needed and that the new theories must be non-computational, unlike
current theories, such as the “Standard Model”, which are all particular
quantum mechanical theories. On the way he also demolishes all hope for
true artificial intelligence.
Of course, this argument attracted much comment [3, 4]. The critics
observe that real computer programs appear to have a much richer range
of behavior than the kind of computation used in Turing’s theorem. This
theorem applies to strictly non-interactive computer programs (technically
known as Turing machines), whereas real intelligent entities are obviously
much more like interactive computer programs. But Penrose always appears
to have a comeback. For example, if an intelligent computer needs to be
trained by an environment, then he tells us to simulate the environment by a
computer, just as one might hook up an aircraft control computer to a flight
simulator instead of a real crashable jumbo jet.
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Thus Penrose counters the criticism by observing that from an interactive
program one can construct a non-interactive program, i.e., one that does not
depend on repeated interaction with other beings or with an environment. I
will show that this construction fails. The construction of a non-interactive
program satisfying a particular precise specification of the kind needed in
the Turing theorem inevitably loses access to the full powers of a putative
intelligent interactive program.
2 Turing’s halting theorem
The technical results use the concept of a “Turing machine”. Now a Turing
machine is simply any device for performing a defined computation. Turing’s
achievement was to characterize this mathematically, i.e., to define in general
what a computer program is. Hence, instead of Turing machines, we can
equally well discuss realistic computers and actual programming languages.
The halting theorem — see Penrose’s excellent treatment [2] — concerns
a subroutine Tk(n) which takes one argument and which obeys the following
specification:
Tk(n) halts if and only if it has constructed a correct proof that
the one-argument subroutine defined by n does not halt when
presented with data n.
Here, the subscript in Tk represents the source code for the subroutine. The
argument n is the source code for another subroutine, and Tk concerns itself
with proving properties of this second subroutine.
Turing’s halting theorem is obtained when one sets n = k, i.e., when
Tk is asked to prove a theorem about itself. There is a contradiction unless
Tk(k) does not halt; this result is exactly the halting theorem. From the
subroutine’s specification, we see that the subroutine is unable to prove this
same theorem, the one stated in the previous sentence.
But humans can prove the theorem. From this follow the conclusions
about the impossibility of artificial intelligence, etc.
3 Non-Turing computations
What is the relation between a dry abstract theorem-proving subroutine and
a computer program simulating biological organisms? The behavior of the
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organisms (even the mathematicians) is clearly a lot richer and more varied
than that of the theorem prover. Basically the answer is in the common
assertion that all computers and computer programs are examples of Turing
machines; that is, they can each be viewed as some subroutine Tk. To obtain
the Turing machine used in the halting theorem, one simply has to ask the
simulated mathematician to prove an appropriate theorem.
However, the common assertion, of the equivalence between Turing ma-
chines and computer programs, is not exactly correct. The idea of a Turing
machine is that it is given some definite input, it runs, and then it returns
the results of the computation. This is appropriate for the calculation of a
trigonometric function, for example. But a real computer program may be
interactive; it may repeatedly send output to the outside world and receive
input in response, word processors and aircraft control programs being ob-
vious examples. Such computer programs are not Turing machines, strictly
speaking. As Geroch and Hartle [5] have observed, a Turing machine is
equivalent to a particular kind of computer program, a program whose input
is all performed in a single statement that is executed once.
The legalistic distinction between Turing and non-Turing computations
matters critically for Penrose’s results. Software that attempts to mimic
real intelligence must surely be in the more extended class of interactive
programs. Moreover, if one is to avoid programming all the details of its be-
havior, the program must learn appropriate responses in interaction with an
environment. The prototypical case is unsupervised learning by an artificial
neural network, an idea with obvious and explicit inspiration from biological
systems.
To be able to using the halting theorem, one must demonstrate that, given
some software that genuinely reproduces human behavior, one can construct
from it a subroutine of the Turing type suitable for use in the theorem.
4 Interactive programs
Penrose [2] gives a number of examples, that appear to show that it is easy
to construct the requisite non-interactive subroutine using the interactive
program as a component.
However, there is a big problem in figuring out how to present the input
to the program, to tell it what theorem is to be proved. Now the program,
which we can call an artificial mathematician, is in the position of a research
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scientist whose employer specifies a problem to be worked on. To be effective,
such a researcher must be able to question the employer’s orders at any point
in the project. The researcher’s questions will depend on the details of the
progress of the research. (“What you suggested didn’t quite work out. Did
you intend me to look at the properties of XXYZ rather than XYZ?”) As
every scientist knows, if the researcher does not have the freedom to ask
unanticipated questions, the whole research program may fail to achieve its
goals.
Therefore to construct the non-interactive program needed by Penrose
one must discover the questions the artificial mathematician will ask and
attach a device to present the answers in sequence.1 The combination of the
original computer and the answering machine is the entity to which Turing’s
halting theorem is to be applied.
How does one discover ahead of time the questions that will be asked?
(Remember that the program is sufficiently complex that one does not de-
sign it by planning ahead of time the exact sequence of instructions to be
executed.) One obvious possibility is simply to run the program interactively
to discover the questions. Then one programs the answering machine with
the correct answers and reruns the program.
This is exactly what a software manufacturer might do to provide a
demonstration of a graphical design program. Both the graphical design
program and the answering machine are interactive programs; but the com-
bination receives no input from the outside world and is therefore an actual
Turing machine.
Here comes a difficulty that as far as I can see is unsolvable. The first
input to the program was a request to prove a particular theorem about a
particular computing system. This computing system happened to be the
program itself, together with all its ancillary equipment. When one reruns
the program after recording the answers to its questions, the theorem under
consideration has changed. The theorem is now about the original computing
system including the answering machine, and, most importantly, the answers
recorded on it.
The answers were recorded when the program was asked to prove a theo-
1 In the case of a complete microscopic simulation of the real world, one must also
figure out how to present mathematics research problems to the beings that are created
by the simulation. This is quite non-trivial given that the actual programming concerned
itself exclusively with the interactions of quarks, gluons and electrons. Nevertheless let us
assume that this problem has been solved.
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rem about the computing system with no answers on the answering machine.
Why should the questions remain the same when the theorem has changed?
If they don’t, then the recorded answers can easily be wildly inappropriate.
Of course, the theorem has not changed very much. However, in a com-
plex computing system the output often depends sensitively on the details
of the input. Indeed, a system that is intended to be intelligent and creative
should show just such unpredictable behavior.
No matter how one goes about it, to discover the exact questions that the
artificial mathematician will ask requires us to know the answers. But one
doesn’t know which answers are needed until one knows the questions. And
one must know the exact questions and answers, for otherwise one cannot
set up the subroutine used in Turing’s halting theorem. The subroutine is
asked to prove a theoremK about a certain subroutine. The proof of Turing’s
halting theorem is inapplicable if even one bit of machine code differs between
the subroutine that attempts to prove the theoremK and the subroutine that
is the subject of the theorem.
Once one realizes that the exact information on the questions and answers
cannot be found, the applicability of the halting theorem to a simulation of
biological organisms fails, and with it Penrose’s chain of argument.
5 Conclusion
Intelligent software must behave much more like a human than the kinds of
software that are encompassed by the strict definition of a Turing machine.
Penrose’s conclusion requires taking absolutely literally the idea that every
computation can be reduced to some Turing machine, so that he can use
Turing’s halting theorem. The proof of the theorem requires perfect equality
between a certain subroutine that proves theorems and the subroutine that
is the subject of a theorem to be proved. But the practicalities of convert-
ing intelligent software to the non-interactive software used in the halting
theorem preclude one from achieving this exact equality.
We see here an example of a common phenomenon in science: any state-
ment we make about the real world is at least slightly inaccurate. When
we employ logical and mathematical reasoning to make predictions, the rea-
soning is only applicable if it is robust against likely deviations between the
mathematics and the real world. This does not seem to be the case for
Penrose’s reasoning.
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